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Twenty lectures on algorithmic game theory Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University, California)

By: Roughgarden, Tim [VerfasserIn].
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: Cambridge New York, NY Melbourne Cambridge University Press 2016Description: xiii, 341 Seiten Diagramme 24 cm.Content type: Text Media type: ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen Carrier type: BandISBN: 9781107172661; 9781316624791.Subject(s): Algorithmische Spieltheorie | Game theory | Algorithms | Algorithms | Game theoryDDC classification: 519.3 Other classification: 85.03 | 31.80 | 54.10 | QH 430 | SK 860 | mat
Contents:
Contents: 1. Introduction and examples ; 2. Mechanism design basics ; 3. Myerson's Lemma ; 4. Algorithmic mechanism design 34 ; 5. Revenue-maximizing auctions ; 6. Simple near-optimal auctions ; 7. Multi-parameter mechanism design ; 8. Spectrum auctions ; 9. Mechanism design with payment constraints ; 10. Kidney exchange and stable matching ; 11. Selfish routing and the price of anarchy ; 12. Network over-provisioning and atomic selfish routing ; 13. Equilibria: definitions, examples, and existence ; 14. Robust price-of-anarchy bounds in smooth games ; 15. Best-case and strong Nash equilibria ; 16. Best-response dynamics ; 17. No-regret dynamics ; 18. Swap regret and the Minimax theorem ; 19. Pure Nash equilibria and PLS-completeness ; 20. Mixed Nash equilibria and PPAD-completeness.
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Item type Current location Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Monographie ausleihbar Monographie ausleihbar PIK
PIK M 490-19-92440 (Browse shelf) Checked out 13/06/2019 00048760X
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references (pages 309-328) and index

Contents: 1. Introduction and examples ; 2. Mechanism design basics ; 3. Myerson's Lemma ; 4. Algorithmic mechanism design 34 ; 5. Revenue-maximizing auctions ; 6. Simple near-optimal auctions ; 7. Multi-parameter mechanism design ; 8. Spectrum auctions ; 9. Mechanism design with payment constraints ; 10. Kidney exchange and stable matching ; 11. Selfish routing and the price of anarchy ; 12. Network over-provisioning and atomic selfish routing ; 13. Equilibria: definitions, examples, and existence ; 14. Robust price-of-anarchy bounds in smooth games ; 15. Best-case and strong Nash equilibria ; 16. Best-response dynamics ; 17. No-regret dynamics ; 18. Swap regret and the Minimax theorem ; 19. Pure Nash equilibria and PLS-completeness ; 20. Mixed Nash equilibria and PPAD-completeness.

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